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EXPECTED HOME OWNERSHIP AND REAL
WEALTH ACCUMULATION OF YOUTH
ABSTRACT
This paper describes the real wealth accumulation
behavior to variations in real constant-quality house prices
of American youth and relates this
in their localities of residence. We
argue that increases in the real constant-quality house price have two offsetting effects on wealth.
First, the greater the local constant-quality price of housing, the greater the wealth needed to meet
the lender imposed down payment constraint if housing demand is price inelastic. However,
increased real constant-quality house price reduces the likelihood of home ownership and thus
the desire the accumulate wealth needed for a down payment.
Using a panel data set for youth age 20-33 for the years 1985 through 1990 we find that
the combined direct and indirect impact of variations in real constant-quality house price on
wealth is modest for changes near the average real house price, but youths’ wealth declines
substantially in areas with high real house price.
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Philadelphia, PA 19104I. Introduction
Many have argued that wealth is an important determinant of home ownership,
largely owing to the down payment requirement of the secondary market and FHA (Jones
1989; Linneman and Wachter 1989; Zorn 1989). The less is wealth, the more binding is
the constraint and the lower is home ownership. 1 However, wealth of nonowning
individuals is largely an endogenous variable, depending on their decisions about forming
households, working hours, and saving earned income (Haunn, Hendershott, and Kim,
1994).2 Treating wealth as a determinant of home ownership puts the cart before the
horse; more likely, it is the desire to become home owners that leads young individuals to
accumulate wealth rather than wealth growth causing ownership. In fact, we are able to
document a relation between wealth accumulation and the predicted home ownership rate,
both concurrent and five years in the fiture.
We are especially interested in the role real house prices play in the link between
wealth accumulation and the likelihood of home ownership. Because the price elasticity of
housing quantity demand is less than unity in absolute value,3 the required down payment
will be larger in areas with high real constant-quality house prices, and thus a household
desiring to become an owner must accumulate more wealth in such areas.4 However, the
higher is the real house price (relative to rents), the higher is the cost of owning relative to
renting and thus the less attractive is home ownership, Moreover, the down payment
constraint is more difficult to meet in these high cost areas, causing some young
households choose to forego home ownership. The lower desired ownership in high price
areas will reduce saving (Yoshikawa and Ohtake 1989; Engelhardt 1994; Sheiner 1995).
The effect of higher real house prices on wealth accumulation is the net of less saving
owing to fewer intended owners but greater saving by those with positive intentions,
The next section of the paper reviews studies that test the relationship between
house prices and wealth. Then, we describe the primary data set, the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), and the secondary data set drawn from the repeat
2sales Freddie Mac~annie Mae constant-quality house price index. The descriptive
analysis in Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (1995) is reviewed and selected
relationships between wealth and house price are presented in section IV. In section V,
the econometric model is described and estimation results are listed. Section VI highlights
the interesting findings.
II. Review of Studies on Wealth and the Tendency to Own a Home
The paper by Yoshikawa and Ohtake (Y-O, 1989) explains female labor supply
and household savings. They argue that utility maximizing renter households choose
whether to pursue either a strategy of fiture renting or one where they will become home
owners. Those who select the renter path will not be influenced by the constant-quality
price of home ownership. They hypothesize that those planning to become owners will
save more the higher is the price (especially in Japan where the down payment averages
40% of house value).s However, an increase in the relative price of owning, resulting
from higher real constant-quality house prices, decreases the tendency to own.G Thus,
higher house prices cause some potential owners to become permanent renters, lowering
their savings, while those households remaining on the path to ownership increase their
savings. The combined effect is ambiguous.
Their data include a variable indicating whether a household has a housing
purchase plan (dichotomous), They first estimate a probit equation and find that a higher
price of land reduces the number of households having a purchase plan. In separate
selectivity bias corrected estimations of household savings rates on land prices, they find
that those households who plan to own have a higher rate of savings if land prices rise, but
those who plan to rent are unaffected. Among those with a purchase plan, the impact
upon the savings rate of increased land prices is about zero when both the conditional
impact and the tendency to switch desired tenure are accounted for. Among all renters,
they find that increased land prices reduce the savings rate of households age 25-55.
3Questions about the study include the nature of the sample and the choice of
explanatory variables used. Because the sample is limited to renters, households that
successfully accumulate sufficient wealth to become owners are systematically excluded
from the analysis. This elimination of “successful savers” may bias the estimation results,
Turning to specific variables, the use of land price rather than constant-quality house price
is a limitation. Also, they include current wealth in the ownership and savings rate
estimations, failing to account for its endogeneity, and their estimation of the tendency to
own (participation in a savings plan for ownership) excludes key variables such as the
price of owning relative to renting.
Engelhardt (1994), using a Canadian data set, analyzes the relationship between
saving for a down payment and constant-quality real house prices. The approach is similar
to Yoshikawa and Ohtake: Canadian renters chose whether to participate in the Registered
Home Ownership Savings Plan that provided a tax benefit to savings used for the purchase
of a home. Some tax benefit accrues to participants even if they never intended to own
due to the deferral of taxes, but other IRA-like programs were available as substitutes.
In the probit participation equation, Engelhardt finds that the higher is real house
price, the lower is participation in the plan, but the effect is weak.7 Engelhardt then
estimates selectivity bias corrected savings equations for participants and nonparticipants
and finds no response to high house prices by nonparticipants (similar to Y-O). In
contrast to Y-O, Engelhardt finds that savings fall as constant-quality house prices rise for
participants, although the effect is only marginally significant. The combined effect is one
of strong discouragement; high house prices reduce both the tendency to own a home and
the rate of savings for those who plan to own. A weakness of this study includes its
measure of house prices; only six Canadian regions adjusted for two categories of city size
are included, and apparently house prices are not deflated by regional price indexes.
Further, the data are cross-sectional and are limited to renters,A third study by Sheiner (1995) finds that increased house prices lead to increased
renter wealth. She used a 1984 cross section of the PSID in 26 U.S. metropolitan areas.
For 25 to 34-year-old households, a $10,000 increase in real house price yielded an
increase in net worth of $400,
All these studies have limited their obsewations to renters. This limitation is a
concern because of the possibility of adverse selection of households who have not
successfully saved for ownership, We report results for panel data that includes renters
and home owners. The inclusion of owners requires us to adjust for their real wealth
accumulation via real capital gains on housing and declines in the real value of their
mortgage.8
These studies also employed cross-sectional data, which is a concern because prior
research on wealth accumulation has shown that cross-sectional estimation can lead to
biased results (Jianakoplos, Menchik, and Irvine 1989). Panel data allow us to use a richer
model of the stochastic error structure, helping to compensate for omitted variables and to
obtain unbiased estimates.
Finally, we focus on wealth rather than annual saving, Saving is smaller and
subject to greater variation than is wealth; thus, identi&lng significant explanatory factors
is more difficult. Also, down payments are in levels, not rates of change in wealth. Thus,
households have a targeted amount of desired wealth based on desired house value.
IIt. Model of Wealth Accumulation and the Tendency to Own a Home
Two opposing economic forces affect the desire of middle and high permanent
income renters to become owners. A positive force is the well-known U. S. tax advantage
of home ownership for higher permanent income (tax bracket) households @user and
Sanders 1983; Litzenberger and Sosin 1978), which provides an incentive to save and
accumulate the required down payment.g An opposing force is the intertemporal
distortion in consumption of young households caused by saving to accumulate the down
5payment (Artle and Varaiya 1978). The greater is the cost of this distortion compared
with the present value gain in tax benefits, the less likely a household will plan to be a
home owner any time soon. The probability of ownership is a measure of the net impact
of these forces, We hypothesize that the greater is this probability, the greater are savings,
ceteris paribus.
Variations in constant-quality real house prices can affect the time to first home
ownership. 10 The higher are house prices relative to rents, the lower is desired home
ownership. Also, higher real house prices will increase the down payment on the desired
house (because the demand for housing is price inelastic) and thus the intertemporal
distortion caused by saving for the down payment.
We first estimate the probability of home ownership as a reduced form equation
including as explanatory variables exogenous socio-demographic and economic factors
including the real price of housing, which should have a negative impact. This approach
avoids the endogeneity problems inherent in the user cost approach to estimating the
ownership equation. 11
Next, we estimate a wealth accumulation equation including as explanatory
variables the predicted probability of owning, real constant-quality house price, and a
vector of socio-demographic controls. The expected coefficient of the probability of
ownership is positive. Because the needed down payment varies with the expenditure on
the house and this expenditure will rise or fall depending on whether the housing demand
is inelastic or elastic, the sign of the coefficient of real constant-quality house price in the
wealth equation could be positive or negative, However, because existing econometric
evidence points to an inelastic demand, we expect a positive coefficient.
IV. Date Sources and Measurements
The scope of this study requires a comprehensive data set containing variables
descriptive of the economic/social/demographic characteristics of young households and
6indicators of local shelter costs. Our basic data set is the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY), housed at the Center for Human Resource Research, Ohio State
University. Beginning in 1979, a national survey of youth age 14-21 was administered to
about 10,000 civilian respondents. The retention rate has been about 90°/0in subsequent
years, Data are collected by personal survey except in 1987, which was collected by
telephone (NLS Handbook 1993),
The NLSY sample is composed of a general sample and supplemental samples of
blacks and poor whites, These supplements permit more reliable testing of hypotheses
related to race/ethnicity and low income. Sample weights are provided each year,
allowing statements to be made about the national population of youth. The NLS
Handbook discusses details of the sampling methodology and survey design. Although the
survey began in 1979, wealth data are reported only in broad categories before 1985, and
no housing data were collected in 1991. Thus, our analysis of wealth accumulation is
limited to the period 1985-1990.
Supplemental data on constant-quality house prices are obtained for388 counties
in 101 metropolitan areas from the Freddie-Mac/Fannie-Mae repeat sales house price
index. We match sumey respondents’ counties of residence to these data. 12 Because these
data are indexes, we need a single cross section of house price levels to obtain level data.
We use the 1987 American Chamber of Commerce data (ACCRA 1987).
Nominal variables vary both over time and across space. We control for both by
deflating using the panel data set of state deflators reportedinMcMahon(199 1) covering
1985-1990.13 Other variables used in this study are derived from responses to survey
questions in the NLSY (NLS Handbook 1993),
The wealth variable is the sum of net worth in five categories: housing, vehicles,
other consumer durables, farm/business, and financial instruments. Within the housing
category, an owner’s estimate of both current house value and current mortgage debt arereported. In H-H-W (1995), we compared NLSY wealth data with those in the Survey of
Consumer Finances and found good comparability in the two national samples.’4
V. Descriptive Results
Table 1 presents the age-wealth relationship derived by H-H-W (1995). Reading
across a row shows the increase in real wealth gained by households categorized by the
1985 age of the respondent, We find that real wealth increases rapidly; it takes about four
years to triple at ages 20-23 and double at ages 24-28. The mean amual increase is 22Y0,
ranging from 8.1°/0in 1985-86 to 33.3°/0 in 1986-87. This increase in household real
wealth results from saving, capital gains, and marriage. 15
Reading Table 1 southwest to northeast tracks the change in wealth of a particular
age respondent across different years. The transcribed data (Table 2) reveal a modest
decline in age-constant real wealth in 1986, largely due to a decline in real farm prices.
For ages 22-28, real wealth is greater for respondents of a particular age comparing the
latest year data available to 1985 (the exception is age 27), This result suggests that the
real wealth-age profile of young households was rising over the 1985-90 period.
H-H-W find that wealth is related to many demographic variables including the
respondent’s gender, race/ethnicity, and marital status. The mean wealth of single female
respondents is only 65°/0 of male respondents, Single whites average about three and a
half times more wealth than blacks, Marned whites’ wealth is nearly three times that of
married blacks.
H-H-W also find that real wealth levels are related to two measures of human
capital, highest grade completed and score on an analytical aptitude test, The results show
that wealth rises with education except that the wealth of more highly educated but young
respondents is low compared with less educated youth when the highly educated youth are
still in school fill time. The aptitude test measures age-adjusted abilities in mathematicsand reading. The difference in wealth comparing highest to lowest quartile is dramatic
(about 450%).
Home Ownership and Real Wealth
Home ownership and real wealth are highly correlated. Table 3 (from H-H-W)
presents the real wealth profile of eight groups of households including those who rented
continuously during 1985-90, first time owners in each year 1986 to 1990 (five groups),
those who owned prior to or became owners in 1985, and others (e.g., those few who
switched from owning to renting). Two results are notable,
First, significant wealth accumulation occurs during the year of purchase of the
house, Household wealth more than doubles for people becoming owners in all years
except 1986 (50°/0 increase). One explanation for this is the correlation of first ownership
with the year of marriage during which the wealth of two individuals is combined (9°/0of
the sample married in the year they became a home owner). Wealth also increases by 33
percent on average in the year before first ownership, when 7% of the sample married).
Another explanation for the jump in wealth during the year of purchasing a home is gifis
or inheritances. H-H-W find that the percentage of households receiving these in the year
of first home ownership is significantly greater than that received by renters or existing
owners. The mean size gifi is $5,224, and of those households that received a gift and
purchased a house in the years 1988-90, the average value of the gift equaled 16% of the
purchase price of their house. More than 60% of gifts received during the year of
purchase were at least 5V0of the values of the houses, and more owners continue to
receive gifis/inheritances than do renters, suggesting a pattern of continuing parental
support for a few years after first home ownership.
The second, and possibly most notable, result is that the wealth of nonowners is a
good predictor of the timing of their fiture shift to home ownership. For example,
households that became owners in 1990 had lower wealth in 1985 than did households
that became owners in 1989. This relationship holds for fl other combinations of years,
9Wealth increases across rows, comparing Owner-1990 with Owner- 1989, . . . . to Owner-
1985). Moreover, households that became owners in 1990 had greater wealth than did
those renting in 1990 for at least the five prior years.
These results suggest that both marital status and the probability of becoming a
home owner are important determinants of wealth. The relationship of wealth to fiture
home ownership suggests that the probability of ownership is important to real wealth
accumulation even at low probabilities and becomes quite strong at high probabilities.
Real Wealth and Constant-Quality Real House Prices
The relationship between the real wealth of renters, partitioned by aptitude scores
(and thus presumably permanent income), and real constant-quality house price is
displayed in Table 4 (from H-H-W). For households with midlevel and high analytical
aptitude scores, the data show a positive relation between wealth and constant-quality
house price exists through the 75th percentile, afier which the relationship turns negative.
For households with low test scores and thus presumably low permanent income and little
incentive to own, there is no relation between wealth and constant-quality real house
price. 16
VI. Econometric Model and Results
The procedure consists of two steps: estimation of the probability of owning
(current and five years forward), followed by the estimation of the wealth equation. Both
estimations use the 1985-90 panel data and appropriate panel data estimation techniques.
Probability of Current Ownership
We assume that the tendency to own (yit) is linearly related to a vector of
exogenous socio-economic and demographic variables and a stochastic error consisting of
a household specific component (ui) and a time varying component (v~):
Yit = xit~ + Ui + Vit = xit~ + Cit.
10Further, ownership (dichotomous) occurs if yi, exceeds a critical value (here, normalized
to o):
Oil = 1 if yt ~0, and= Ootherwise.
The “random effects” error structure assumes var(ui + vit) = G.*+ av2, and p = COrr(Eiq
ei~+l). 17 The results of this estimation are used to predict a household’s current tendency
to own in each year of the panel,
Results of the reduced-form estimation of the probability of home ownership in the
current year are presented in Table 5. Explanatory variables include indicators of whether
the respondent is Male, Black, and Married. If married, the spouse’s age and highest
grade completed (HGC) are also relevant. Other variables are measures of the
respondent’s age, highest grade completed, and analytical aptitude, the locality’s constant-
quality real house price and amount of gifis received. Quadratic terms for aptitude, house
price, and respondent and spouse’s age and HGC are included, Interaction terms with
house price and Black are included to allow variations in house price to affect households
differently.
The Chi-squared of this panel data probit estimation is quite significant as are most
of the explanato~ variables. The correlation coefficient (p from above) is 0.88, indicating
that estimation errors for a household persist over time; that is, the standard estimation
approach would consistently over or under-predict the estimation residuals of a household
from 1985-90. Of the 6324 observations (1054 households for six periods), the estimation
correctly predicts 4288 of 4721 (90. 8°/0)cases of renting and 845 of 1603 (52.7°/0) cases
of owning. The sample mean predicted probability of owning is 0.20, rising from roughly
0.12 in 1985 to 0.33 in 1990.
Because of the complexity of the equation, simulation results are needed to clarifi
variables’ impacts. For a white married male respondent, the probability of ownership is
0.46 at mean house price ($87,170) and at means of the other explanatory variables, 1s
The effect of variations in Hprice on the current estimated probability of owning is
11nonlinear. If Hpnce is one standard deviation below its mean (s.d. = $21,974), ownership
probability remains about the same. At one standard deviation above the mean constant-
quality house price, the probability falls to 0.40 (a 11 percent drop), and at two standard
deviations above the mean, the ownership probability falls to 0.31 (another 22 percent
drop),lg
The probability of ownership is much lower for black respondents even if
evaluated at the same sample means of the explanatory variables. At mean Hprice, the
ownership probability is 0.18. At one standard deviation below the mean, the probability
of ownership rises slightly to 0.19, while at one and two standard deviations above the
mean, the ownership probability for black households falls to 0.15 and 0.10.
Marriage has an enormous impact as we expected. Marriage to a high school
graduate age 26 increases the probability of ownership for a white youth from 0,13 to
0.46. Age also has a large impact on the probability of ownership, For a youth and
spouse, an increase in age from 26 to 32 raises the probability of ownership from 0.46 to
0.83.
Probability that Current Renters Wil[ Own in Five Years
A similar method is used to estimate the probability that 1985 renters will be
owners in 1990. The sample consists of all respondents because exclusion of current
owners would result in selection bias.20 The dependent variable is the actual 1990
ownership status. Explanatory variables include 1985 socio-demographic variables (with
age updated five years) except gifis/inheritances and marital status, both being forecasts of
the 1990 outcome.2] We also control for current ownership status by including the 1985
probability of ownership in the equation, With a sample size of 1064, 89% of instances of
future renting are correctly predicted and 47% of fiture ownership (results are presented
in Appendix 2). We use the estimation results to predict fiture ownership for the 1985-90
panel; that is, ownership rates in 1990-95.
12Real Wealth
The second step estimates the structural real wealth equation. In general, wealth
accumulation is presumed to depend on liquidity, retirement, and bequest motives. For
many young households, purchasing a home is the start of their retirement plan.
In this study, we highlight the impacts of variation in the probability of owning and
in real local house prices on real wealth (WL). The econometric model again uses the
random effects approach:
w, = Zit~ + Pi + Vit
where E(~i) = E(vit) = O,and pw = co~(~i + vit, pi + vit+l). We also allow the vit error
term to be autocorrelated; thus, v il+l= Piv it + ~it.22 Explanatory variables include
demographic indicators: Male, Black, Squared Age, Married, Spouse Age, and a variable
SumMarry measuring the total number of years married during the sample period .23
Educational attainment measures include four variables: HGC, Spouse HGC, Aptitude,
and Squared Aptitude. We also include a Squared Age-HGC interaction because of the
likely delayed increase in wealth for respondents achieving post baccalaureate education.
Each of these variables indicates the status of the respondent in year t corresponding to
wealth in that year.
One of the focal variables is the probability of home ownership predicted in the
first step of the procedure. We expect that the greater this probability, the greater the
need for early wealth accumulation for a down payment, default insurance fees and closing
costs.24 To allow for a nonlinear response of real wealth to variations in Probown, we
include its square. Preliminary testing revealed that only the squared term was significant,
We also include the probability of ownership five years in the fiture (Probown5) to
capture the impact of fiture ownership tendencies on current wealth accumulation,
The other highlighted variable is local real house price, Hprice. Variations in
constant-quality real house price affect wealth indirectly through the squared Probown and
Probown5 variables (reduce the probability when Hprice rises) and directly by changing
13the quantity of housing demanded and the needed down payment, The quantity of housing
demanded by a household depends negatively on the real constant-quality house price in
the locality, but the down payment depends on the expenditure on the house; that is, the
product of Hpnce and housing quantity. Thus, variations in expenditure with Hprice
depend on the price elasticity of demand of owned housing; if less than unity, we expect
increased Hpnce to raise expenditures on housing and thus the needed down payment,
We test for separate impact of Hprice on black and other youth because the price elasticity
of demand may differ among groups.
Another economic variable is the cumulative amount of gifts received by the
household. This variable was hypothesized to be important to the growth of wealth during
the preownership period by Mayer and Englehardt (1994) and was found to be an
important component of the down payment by Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (1995).
Because our sample contains both renters (4380 obsewations) and owners (282
first time owners and 1662 post first year owners), we must account for any exogenous
gains in real wealth accruing to owners. Because we have owner estimates of the house
value, we can measure housing capital gains. Yearly gains are deflated and cumulated to
year t from 1985 or the year of first ownership yielding Capgain. We expect a coefficient
somewhat less than unity because households have time (three years on average) to
increase consumption in response to real housing capital gains, as predicted by
intertemporal utility optimization.
We also created a variable that measures the difference between cumulated
nominal housing capital housing gains and the real gain (Diffgain). If the down payment
constraint were binding, then it is likely that a nominal capital gain would lead youth to
reduce equity in the house and move consumption closer to the optimal path. This
“consumption rebound” is predicted by the models of Artle and Varaiya (1978) and
Engelhardt (1994), We expect a coefficient between zero and minus unity.
14Lastly, we include the cumulative change in the real book value of a household’s
mortgage. Over time, home owners pay down their mortgage and its real value declines
due to inflation, We control for this change in real wealth by home owners, which we
view as forced saving, expecting a coefficient between Oand -1.0.25
Estimation results are reported in the first panel of Table 6. The adjusted R2 is
0.39. The correlation of household residuals is 0.50, and a Lagrange Multiplier test of the
estimated random effects model compared with a simple pooled data model (no household
specific error component) yields a value of 4415, which is significant at the 0.001 level.
The estimated autocorrelation of the iterror terms is only 0.05. We conclude that use of
panel data techniques for this estimation is necessary. Further, the magnitude of many
coefficients changes by more than 50 percent comparing the random effects model with
simple pooled data OLS results (see the second panel of Table 6),
In the initial estimation, we find that the coefficient of Diffgain is -1.41,
significantly different from Obut not from -1,0. Because the point estimate of-1.41 is
implausibly large, in subsequent estimation we restricted the coefficient to equal -1,0.
This restriction does not affect the other regression coefficients.
The probability of ownership is an important determinant of real wealth
accumulation of youth. The quadratic term (Squared Probown) is quite significant,
suggesting that household saving surges the nearer is the transition to ownership, Also,
the coefficient of the ownership probability in five years is positive and significant. An
increase in the current probability of owning from 0.1 to 0,2 raises real wealth by $580,
measured at the means of the other explanato~ variables and holding the fiture
probability of owning constant. Further increases in Probown to 0.3 and 0.4 raise wealth
by an additional $960 and $1,350. A dramatic comparison of impacts on wealth contrasts
a household with current and fiture probabilities of owning of 0.2 and 0.5 to one with
values of 0.7 and 0.9, respectively. The estimated difference in real wealth is $10,400,
nearly equal to average wealth in the sample,
15The impact of increased Hprice on real wealth occurs directly and through the
indirect effect on Probown and Probown5. The direct effect is positive and significant for
nonblack households. A one standard-deviation increase in Hprice raises real wealth by
$820 or about 4% of the increase in constant-quality house price. This evidence is
consistent with an inelastic housing demand. The result for black households differs. The
sum of the coefficients of Hprice and Hprice*Black is not statistically different from O;
thus, black households do not increase their wealth if house price rises (Probown and
Probown5 held constant).2b
Increased Hprice lowers both Probown and Probown 5. This effect tends to
reduce wealth, offsetting the direct positive effect of Hprice on the required down
payment, For white households, wealth peaks just below the sample mean Hprice. As
Hprice continues to rise the marginal impact of the direct down payment effect remains
constant but the discouragement effect grows. The result is an inverse-U effect on
wealth, 27 For black households, there is no direct Hprice effect; thus, the discouragement
of ownership effect embodied in the probability of ownership variables dominates at all
house prices.
To contrast our results with those in the literature, we estimated a model omitting
household specific random effects and the probability of home ownership variables (Table
6). We find that the coefficient of Hprice is now negative and significant as in Engelhardt
(1994). For a one standard deviation increase in Hprice, real wealth falls by $650. If we
include household specific random effects, the coefficient of Hprice is still negative, but
smaller, and is marginally significant (t ratio is 1,8).
The coefficient of the Glfi variable is 0.94, thus households receiving a gifi of
greater than $100 add nearly the entire gifi to wealth (“spending” the gift on a down
payment adds to wealth). The real capital gain variable for home owners has a coefficient
of 0.80, indicating some conversion of real housing gains into consumption (20 cents per
16dollar gain) over an average three-year period. The coefficient of the cumulative change
in the real mortgage balance is -0.53, indicating a greater offset (47 cents).2g
The impact of marriage requires evaluating four coefficients (Marry, SumMarry,
Spouse Age and HGC). The estimated wealth of a white male respondent age 26 with 12
years of education married for one year to a similar spouse is $15,500. In contrast, the
same youth, but unmarried, has wealth of $8640. This large impact is expected because
the wealth of two individuals is combined upon marriage and married couples wish to use
the wealth as home equity rather than consuming it.
The impact of age on real wealth is also large. A married white respondent of age
26 has just over half the wealth of one age 32 ($15,500 versus $27,810). A similar result
occurs for an unmarried youth comparing age 26 with 32 (8,640 versus $14,060). Also,
the impact of more education is positive as expected. Comparing a married white couple
with husband and wife age 26 and educated for 12 years to a household where both have
16 years of education but are otherwise similar, we find wealth is $3,600 greater.
VII. Summary of Findings
The literature on tenure choice has shown household wealth to be highly correlated
with home ownership, This result is not surprising given that home owners must
accumulate sufficient wealth to meet market imposed down payment requirements, default
insurance fees, and other closing costs and wish to accumulate additional wealth because
marginal borrowing costs on high LTV loans are high (see note 4). Our focus is on the
factors affecting the accumulation of wealth.
A descriptive analysis of a 1985-90 panel data set of U.S. youth age 20-27 (in
1985) suggests that the desire for home ownership is an important determinant of real
wealth accumulation. Thus we anticipated that the greater is this desire, the shorter will
be the expected duration until purchasing a home and the greater would be real wealth. In
the econometric analysis of household wealth, we include estimates of the squared
17probability of current home ownership and the level of the five-year forward probability.
We find these variables to be very significant and their impact on real wealth to be strong
and highly nonlinear.
The small literature on the relationship of wealth to real constant-quality house
prices has found various results ranging from dominance of a discouragement effect
(“consumption of despair”) to a positive relationship. We argue that spatial and
intertemporal variations in real house prices may affect both the probability of home
ownership and the quantity of housing demanded. We find that increases in real constant-
quality house prices reduce the probability of ownership, thus reducing real wealth. This
result agrees with that of Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) for Japan and Engelhardt (1994)
for Canada. We also test for a price effect on the quantity of housing demanded if
ownership probability is held constant. Increased house price raises respondents’ wealth
(consistent with an inelastic demand for housing) more for whites than blacks, This result
differs from Engelhardt but generally agrees with Y-O,
Overall, we find that variations in real constant-quality house prices have a
significant net effect on the real wealth accumulation of youth, For white respondents, the
relationship of wealth and real house price has an inverse U-shape, peaking near the mean
house price. For black respondents, there is little variation of wealth for house prices
below the mean; thereafter, wealth falls with increasing house prices.
We find that many other socio-econornic and demographic variables affect the
wealth of youth, Significant effects are noted for gender, age, highest grade completed,
analytical aptitude, and marital status. These variables affect wealth both directly and
indirectly through the probability of home ownership.
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20ENDNOTES
1The stagnant U.S. home ownership rate since 1980 has led to calls for Federal actions to
lower this requirement (e.g., in the fall of 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed zero
down payment loans), However, Green’s analysis (1996) suggests that underwriting
standards are not responsible for the stagnant aggregate rate in the 1980s. In 42 of 50
states, the ratio of house prices to income declined, and in 47 states the ratio of housing
expenses to income fell.
2Unexpected gifis and real capital gains change wealth exogenously (but can be offset).
3Rosen (1979) suggests an elasticity of about -0.7.
4 Households have an incentive not only to make the minimum down payment, but to
make a 20 percent down payment. Generally private mortgage insurance is required on
loans with less than 20 percent down, and the one-third percentage point extra charge on
10 percent down loans is applied to the entire loan balance. If the loan rate on an 80V0
loan is 8% and on a 90°A loan is 8.34Y0, the marginal rate being charged on the last 10% is
11% (solve 80(8) + 1O(X)= 90(8.34) for x),
5. They ignore the negative effect of increased house price on housing demand. Unless
demand is inelastic, higher house prices will lower the required down payment.
GWhile real rents tend to be higher in high real house price areas, the ratio still rises,
7A larger effect is obtained when the price/income ratio is used, but this reflects the effect
of low real income, not low real house prices.
8The preferred sample would be renters plus the first year (or two) of home ownership.
This would require significantly more complex panel data estimation owing to the
variation in the length of individual panel members.
9 Renting is optimal, possibly for their lifetime, for low income households because
landlords’ tax benefits (reflected in the rent) exceed those that they can obtain as owners.
10For inframarginal renters, these variations have no impact.
1’The user cost approach requires an estimate of income to calculate marginal and tenure
choice tax rates; however, income is clearly endogenous for young households given that
they select labor supply.
‘2 The quality of the data was discussed in H-H-W (1995). In general, its reliability
appears good.
“ The number of local area CPIS is limited, thus using state data allows all observations to
remain in the sample. The population weighted mean price index is: 1985=100,
1986=102.5, 1987=105.4, 1988=108.6, 1989=112.0, and 1990=113.9.
2114In the ~SY data set, reported wealth is truncated to protect privacy. Because we
delete households with wealth exceeding the truncation points from our sample, the
wealth profiles are not overly influenced by a few extraordinarily wealthy households.
15Reading down a column yields a cross-sectional snapshot of wealth for households age
20-28 in 1985, 21-29 in 1986, etc.
‘bH-H-W also show that home ownership rates vary inversely with real house prices.
17This model was developed by Butler and Moffltt (1982). Technical details concerning
the maximum likelihood estimation procedure are given in the Limdep Manual, version 6.0
(p. 440).
‘8Age of respondent and spouse is 26 and both have 12 years of education.
19The sample minimum and maximum Hprice obsemations occur at two s.d. and three s.d.
from the mean.
20If 1985 owners are excluded, we systematically omit respondents who successfully
saved and purchased a home. The residual sample consists of 20-27 year old youth who
failed to become owners; thus, no effect of age on eventual ownership is found. Lacking
any age effect on the tendency to own yields the improbable conclusion that 1990
ownership rates are similar to 1985 rates. Inclusion of 1985 owners solves this problem.
2]We use a tobit model to forecast gifts and a probit model for marriage.
22The estimation procedure is generalized least squares (Greene, 1996, p. 299).
23The coefficient of the Age variable differed little from zero.
24During the 1985-90 period, the secondary market generally required 5 percent down
plus a 1.5 percent first year insurance premium. FHA required 3 to 5 percent down plus a
largely borrrowable 3.8 percent up-front insurance premium, Closing costs and escrow
accounts are another one to two and a half points for high LTV loans (FHA borrowers
could borrow most of the closing costs)..
25The longer the household is post ownership, the easier it is to offset the decline in real
mortgage debt via home equity loans or refinancing.
26This result assumes that the Freddie/Fannie repeat sales price index and our cross-
sectional scaling of this index is accurate for locations occupied by black households.
27For our married white 26 year old, estimated wealth at various Hprices from two
standard deviations below mean Hprice to two above is ($13,600, $15,230, $15,500,
$14,370, and $12,870).
28Other coefficients are relatively unchanged by the omission of the mortgage variable.





1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Sample
Size
20 3410 3198 5332 8519 10005 12224 525
21 4136 4992 7082 8917 10065 15672 774
22 I 4586 I 5332 I 8339 I 10654 I 13258 I 16213 I 741
23 6262 7784 12937 15852 17018 19304 721
24 8875 8915 11849 13428 15670 19440 670
25 9607 10220 14977 16114 20847 24118 605
26 12032 12472 16714 22251 23051 24134 555
27 17072 16764 22297 24435 28273 32759 544
28 17673 20744 21016 24811 31852 38798 119
Mean 9295 10047 13394 16109 18893 20358
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Renter Owner Owner Owner Owner Owner Owner Other
1985-90 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985
1985 3326 4121 5578 6742 10290 12714 29615
- - ~
14834
1986 3082 4389 4911 8465 12103 18721 31193 16157
1987 4607 6387 9514 11412 28785 30853 39112 19070
1988 5510 8635 12900 28513 30596 35761 43354 20241
1989 6531 12563 26442 35420 36411 40804 46423 20976
1990 8297 26183 29554 46158 37615 46507 54021 19401
Mean 5226 10380 14817 22785 25967 30893 40620 18447
Tab/e 4: Renters’ Mean Real Wealth by Three Levels of Aptitude Test Score













1985 Constant-Quality House Price Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25%- 50%-75% Highest 25%
50%
8786 11726 11582 7535
5959 5504 10809 6855
3095 3054 3649 3232
5827 6347 8461 5718
24Tab/e 5: Panel Data Probit Estimation of the Probability of Owning a Home Currently
N = 6324:101
Explanato~ Variable Coefficient Standard Mean
Error
Male 0.110 0.007” 0.45
1 I 1
Black I -0.458 0.116** 0.26
I
1 I 1
Married -1.100 0.076” 0.41
Hprice 0.012 0.002” 87.17
Age -0,165 0.007” 26.23
1 ,
HGC -0.230 0.01 o** 13.00
Spouse-Age I 0.109 0.004’” 28.08’”
I I I
Spouse-HGC I 0.050 0.009” 12.93***
I 1 1
Aptitude 0.014 0.001”’ 45.35
Gifts -0.027 0.009” 0.25
Squared Hprice -0.00013 O.00001** 8081.7
1 1 ,
Squared Age 0.00534 0.00023” 328.96
, ,
Squared HGC I -0.00802 0.00038” 173.88
Squared Aptitude -0.00007 0.00001” 2891.8
Squared Spouse-Age -0.00160 0.00006” 328.96
Squared Spouse-HGC -0.00173 0.00035” 70.20
Hprice*Age I 0.00027 I 0.00007** I2294.4 I
Hprice*Black -0.00066 0.00043 22,97
I
Hprice*Marry 0.00040 0.00038 35.24 I
Hprice*Gifts 0.00050 I 0.00011” 20.71 I
Black*HGC I 0.066 I 0.005” I 3.34
Black*Age -0.030 0.003” 6.89
Black*Marry -0.278 0.019’” 0.59
Rho 0.884 0,001”’
I respondents for 6 years. Wealth, Gifts, and Hprice are measured in
thousands of dollars. Log-Likelihood = -1778.1; Slopes = O log-likelihood = -2481.5.
*Significant at 0.05; l ’Significant at 0.01; l **Mean is for married respondents, singles
have the spouse variables set to O.
25Table 6 Random Effects and Simple Pooled Data Estimation of Household Wealth
Explanatory ‘ Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Mean
Variable Error Error Error
Random Effects Simple Pooled Data Reference Simple
Model Model Pooled Data Model
Constant 29.09 6.38** 14.69 5.94** 21.23 5.93
Male 1.79 0.75”” 1.97 0.41”” 2,78 0.41** 0.45
Black 1.31 2.55 1.32 2.11 -4.13 0.51** 0.26
Married -11.94 2.90”” -17.93 2.61** -23.80 2.57** 0.41
SumMarry 0.70 0.18ti 0.43 0.19* 0.75 0.19*” 1.32
HGC -2.89 0.51** -1.67 0.46”” -2.21 0.46- 13.00
Spouse-Age 0.23 0.09” 0.40 0.08”’ 0.67 0.07- 28.08””
Spouse-HGC 0.65 0.17** 0.69 0.15** 1.05 0.15* 12.93***
Aptitude 0.11 0.05” 0.06 0.03” 0.12 0.03”’ 45.35
Gift 0.94 O.1O’* 1.57 0.12** 1.68 0.12** 0.25
Squared Age -0.052 0.008”- -0.036 0.008’ -0.033 0.008”” 696.08
Squared Aptitude -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0007 0.0003** -0.0008 0.0003* 2891.8
Squared Age*HGC 0.0048 0.0006** 0,0033 0.0006” 0.0039 0.0006’” 341.62
Squared Probown 19.28 2.50’” 25.45 2.36** ---- -... 0.13
Probown5 4.33 0.21** 8.04 2.21** ---- .... 2.37
Hprice 0.037 0.01 9* 0.046 0.017” -0.030 0.009* 3.52
Hprice*Black -0.041 0.026 -0.029 0.022 ---- ---- 22.51
Capital Gain*ti* 0.80 0.03’” 0.85 0.03** 0.88 0.03- 0.84
DiffGaintiti -1.0 ---- -1.0 ---- -1.0 ----
Mortgage**”* -0.53 0.03H -0.64 0.04”’ -0.65 0.04* -0.11
N = 6324:1064 respondents for 6 years. Wealth, Gifts, Hprice, Capital Gains, and Mortgage are
measured in thousands of dollars.
*Significant at 0.05; **Significant at 0.01.
‘i*Mean is for married respondents, singles have the spouse variables set to O.
****Cumulative from date of purchase or 1985.
Adjusted R-squared = 0.40, 0.39, 0.38 respectively.
Lagrange Multiplier Test of no household specific random effects = 4415, 1 d.f., significant at
0.01.
26Appendix 1: Asset Catego~ Definitions and Truncation Points in the NLSY and SCF Data Sets
The truncation points are the same in each year of the survey. Truncation is applied
independently in each catego~. A respondent with a truncated value in any category is deleted
from the sample.
1. Liquid Assets: sum of cash, savings & checking accounts, funds in money market and credit
unions, U.S. savings bonds, IRAs, Keoghs, certificates of deposit, personal loans to others
[truncated if> $500,000].
2. Mutual and Investment Funds: sum of value of common stock, preferred stock, stock options,
corporate bonds, government bonds, mutual funds [truncated if > $500,000] <and> value of
rights to an estate or investment trust [truncated
if> $500,()()0].
3, Net Value of Durables: value of motor vehicles including cars, trucks, motorcycles, motor
homes [truncated if > $30,000] cless> debt on motor vehicles [truncated if > $30,000] <and>
value of other durables (each worth more than $500) including furniture, appliances, boats,
jewelry, stereo, collections [truncated if> $150,000] <less> other debts including those to stores,
doctors, hospitals, banks, or other people [truncated if> $150,000].
4. Value of investment in a farm, business, or professional practice [truncated if > $500,000]
<less> debts on farm, business, professional practice [truncated if> $500,000].
5. House Value (home owners only) [truncated if> $150,000].
6. Sum of mortgage, back taxes, home improvement loans (home owners only) [truncated if >
$150,000].
27Appendix 2: Table A-1: Cross-sectional Data Probit Estimation of the Probability of Owning a
Home in Five Years
Explanato~ Variable Coefficient Standard Error Mean
Male -0.04 0.10 0.45
Black -0.26 2,29 0.26
Married-predicted 8.29 4,46 0.50
Hprice 0.050 0.035 77.42
Age -0.207 0,181* 23.73
HGC -0.389 0,379 12.82
Aptitude -0.014 0.013 45.35
Gift-predicted 1,40 1,69 0.34
Squared Hprice 0.0001 0.0001 6238.8
Squared Age 0.0045 0.0052 568.26
Squared HGC 0.0202 0.0194 168.64
Squared Aptitude 0.0001 0.0001 2891.8
Hprice*Age -0.0026 0.0020 1837.7
Hprice*Black 0.002 0.047 19.70
Hprice*Mar~- -0.023 0.017 39.46
predicted








Black*Age 0.070 0.084 6,23
Black* Mar~-predicted -1.53 2,70 6.23
Probability of 2.72 0.37’” 0.17
Own in 1985
4 = 1064. Wealth, Gifts, and Hprice are measured in thousands of dollars.
*Significant at 0.05; **Significant at 0.01; l **Mean is for married respondents, singles have the
spouse variables set to O.
Log-Likelihood = -562.3 Chi-squared (1 d.f.) test of slopes = Ois 244.0.
28